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In this paper, a formal rent-seeking theory of the rm is developed. The
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seeking for the integrating party, but makes it harder for the integrated one.
In a one-period model, this implies that the rent-seeking contest becomes
more uneven and the parties rent-seek less. Here, integration is optimal. In
the in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to enter a relational contract, under which each promises not to engage in
rent-seeking. Such a contract must be self-enforcing, for it cannot be enforced
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sustainable, as, due to its cost advantage, the integrating party gains more
from deviating than any party under non-integration. Hence, integration is
preferred, if relational contracts are not sustainable, while, otherwise, non-
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1 Introduction
In a recent essay, Gibbons (2005) presents four di¤erent theories of the rm.
One of these theories follows the idea by Williamson (1971, 1979, 1985)
and Klein et al. (1978) stating that integration (with conict resolution by
at) can stop ine¢ cient haggling for appropriable quasi-rents (henceforth,
called rent-seeking). While Gibbons agrees that such rent-seeking between
rms is a leading cost of non-integration, he points to the large literature
emphasizing that rent-seeking occurs within rms as well, i.e. that questions
the e¤ectiveness of at in resolving conicts.1 In this sense, he convincingly
argues that a comprehensive rent-seeking theory of the rm must endogenize
the cost of integration in order to allow rent-seeking to occur within rms as
well. Yet, he leaves the task of formalizing such a theory mainly for future
research.2
The aim of this paper is to ll this gap. In doing so, we face two further
challenges. First and closely related to the endogenous determination of
integration costs, we must show that integration can indeed be worse than
non-integration in some instances. Second, the theory must be in line with
empirical ndings indicating that the likelihood of integration increases in
the size of the appropriable rent.3
At the heart of our theory lies the question, how integration a¤ects the
partiespropensities to rent-seek. To answer this question, note that hag-
gling for rents should cover all activities and, particularly, the elaboration of
strategies that are aimed at forcing the other party to assign part of the rent.
1See, for example, the already mentioned paper by Klein et al. (1978) or the work by
March (1962), Cyert & March (1963) and Pfe¤er (1981).
2In fact, Gibbons briey presents a formal inuence-cost theory of the rm. However,
this theory does not simultaneously master the two challenges to be described in the next
paragraph.
3See, for example, Monteverde & Teece (1982) on ownership structures in the automo-
bile industry, Masten (1984) on ownership structures in the aerospace industry, Anderson
& Schmittlein (1984) on rmsuse of internal and external sales agents or Joskow (1985)
on integration decisions of power companies.
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Such strategies are oftentimes based on threats in case the other party does
not give in. Further, these threats should be more credible and, hence, the
strategies more e¤ective, the better the partys outside options. To give an
example, suppose a party threatens to switch to a di¤erent trading partner
unless the trading conditions are signicantly altered in its favor. Then, this
party is relatively likely to carry out its threat, if the consequences the switch
in the trading partner entails are not too severe. Similarly, the partys initial
trading partner is more likely to make concessions, the more it su¤ers from
an end of the trading relationship. Hence, if one follows the property-rights
theory of the rm (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), which con-
vincingly argues that a partys outside opportunities should improve in the
number of assets the party possesses, a party possessing more assets should
have a relative advantage in the rent-seeking process. We model this rela-
tive advantage by assuming the transfer of an asset within the relationship
to make rent-seeking less costly for the new owner, but more costly for the
initial owner. In the context of the integration/non-integration comparison,
this means that integration makes rent-seeking more costly for the integrated
party, but facilitates rent-seeking for the integrating one.
Applying these considerations to a one-period rent-seeking contest model,
it can be shown that integration mitigates the rent-seeking problem under
quite general conditions by making the contest more uneven. As the contest
becomes less intense, each party decides to rent-seek less. Thus, if changes in
the ownership structure are the only means to solve the rent-seeking problem,
integration is optimal.
The one-period model yields similar results as the informal argumenta-
tions by Williamson and Klein et al.. Yet, it does not answer the question,
why non-integration is, despite the existence of rent-seeking problems, often-
times observed in practice. To nd a satisfying answer, we extend the model
by noting that integration is usually not the only instrument to mitigate the
rent-seeking problem. Especially in long-lasting trading relationships, the
parties may rely on reputational concerns to settle conicts without engag-
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ing in costly rent-seeking activities, i.e. they may enter a relational contract
forbidding the parties to engage in rent-seeking.4 Such a contract cannot
be enforced by court and, hence, must be self-enforcing. Thus, to sustain
a relational contract, the one-period gain of deviating and probably being
awarded the rent at relatively low costs must be outweighed by the loss in
terms of higher rent-seeking costs in future periods.
The analysis of the extended model focuses on how the chosen ownership
structure a¤ects the sustainability of relational contracts. It is shown that
these contracts are less easily sustainable under integration than under non-
integration, which represents an important (and endogenously determined)
cost of integration. This is due to our assumption that integration makes rent
seeking less costly for the integrating party. Therefore, a deviation from the
relational contract is more attractive for this party than for either party under
non-integration. This implies that, for certain model parameters, relational
contracts may be sustained under non-integration, but not under integration,
in which case non-integration is strictly preferred.
To connect our model with the empirical result described before, we an-
alyze, how the sustainability of relational contracts is a¤ected by the size
of the rent. We nd two countervailing e¤ects: First, a higher rent obvi-
ously increases the one-period gain of deviating from the relational contract.
Second, the corresponding loss in future periods is usually higher, too, as,
in the absence of relational contracts, rent-seeking increases in the size of
the rent. In order to make more concrete predictions, we consider a specic
example, in which the rst e¤ect is shown to be always dominant. Hence,
in the example, relational contracts and, accordingly, non-integration are of
particular relevance, if the appropriable rents are relatively small, while, for
larger rents, these contracts are not sustainable and integration is preferred.
4One might wonder, why we stress the role of relational contracts, but neglect formal
contracts in our analysis. This follows from the observation that appropriable quasi-rents
usually exist, only if formal contracts are either incomplete or ine¤ective. Formal contracts
may be implicitly incorporated in the size of the rent. The more detailed these contracts,
the smaller should be the rent.
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Note that this is exactly in line with the empirical results indicating that, for
small rents, non-integration is likely to be preferred, while, for larger rents,
the opposite is true.
Besides to the literature mentioned so far, the paper is related to at
least three other strands of economic literature. First, the paper is naturally
related to the large literature on individual rent-seeking contests initiated
by Tullock (1980) and further developed by e.g. Dixit (1987), Leininger
(1993), Baik (1994), Konrad (2000), Lee (2000), Baye & Hoppe (2003) or
Morgan (2003). Second, the paper is closely related to a relatively small, but
growing literature making contest models the core of a theory of the rm.
Similar to our approach, Masten (1986) uses a contest model to formalize
haggling between rms for appropriable quasi-rents. However, he simply
assumes that integration eliminates all rent-seeking activities, but leads to
xed and exogenously given costs (which are independent of the size of the
rent). As already argued at the beginning of this section, such an approach
has di¤erent shortcomings, which we try to remove by endogenizing the costs
of integration in our model. Müller & Wärneryd (2001) show that outside
ownership may mitigate rent-seeking within rms, as outsiders extract part
of the rent so that insiders have less to ght about. Further, Konrad (2004)
demonstrates that hierarchies, which are characterized by a sequence of rent-
seeking contests, may lead to lower total rent-seeking expenditures.5 Note
that all these papers neglect relational contracts in their analysis. This is
in stark contrast to the third strand of literature the paper is related to.
The contributions by e.g. Garvey (1995), Baker et al. (2002) and Halonen
(2002) emphasize the role of relational contracts for the choice of ownership
structures. Di¤erent from the current paper, however, they neglect rent-
seeking considerations and focus on investment decisions. Therefore, they
are more in the spirit of the property-rights theory of the rm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
5Other papers that use contest models as main part of a theory of the rm include
Ellingsen (1997) and Inderst et al. (2005, 2006).
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the model is presented and the stage game, in which relational contracts are
not feasible, is solved. Section 3 considers the innitely-repeated version of
the stage game and contains the main results of the paper. A discussion of
the model is o¤ered in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 A one-period model of rent-seeking between
and within rms
2.1 Description of the model and notation
As mentioned in the introduction, we model haggling for appropriable quasi-
rents as a rent-seeking contest. Consider a situation with two risk-neutral
and unlimitedly liable parties, i = 1; 2, competing for a rent of size R > 0.
The probability that party 1 receives the rent is given by
p (y1; y2) (1)
and depends on the total rent-seeking activities by both parties, y1  0 and
y2  0, which lead to rent-seeking costs C1 and C2, respectively. Accordingly,
1   p (y1; y2) is the probability that party 2 wins the rent. We impose the
following assumptions on p:
Assumption 1: (i) p is everywhere di¤erentiable, (ii) p is symmetric, i.e.
p (y1; y2) = 1   p (y2; y1), (iii) p1 > 0, p11  0, p2 < 0, p22  0,6 (iv)
p12 > 0, p > 0:5.
Let me briey discuss the intuitions and limitations behind the single as-
sumptions. Concerning part (i) note that, in some applications, the function
p is assumed to be non-di¤erentiable at (y1; y2) = (0; 0). This may well a¤ect
the results to be derived. Hence, in Section 4.1 we discuss the implications of
having a contest-success function p, which is not everywhere di¤erentiable.
6Here, as well as in all what follows, a subscript accompanying the function p denotes
a partial derivative.
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Part (ii) is a standard assumption as well as part (iii), which implies that
rent-seeking has positive but (weakly) diminishing marginal e¤ects on the
own probability of winning the rent. Finally, part (iv) is very intuitive, too.
If, initially, party 1 chooses higher rent-seeking, a marginal increase in y2
makes it more attractive for party 1 to increase y1 as well. This is due to
the more intense competition the increase in party 2s rent-seeking activities
has caused. Similarly, if, initially, y1 < y2, an increase in y2 makes the con-
test more uneven so that it is benecial for party 1 to rent-seek less. Note
that part (iv) together with Youngs theorem implies that p21 > 0, p > 0:5,
which can be interpreted analogously. Notice further that part (iv) is fullled
for the two most popular specications of p(y1; y2), the logit-form contest-
success function7 and the probit-form contest-success function8.
To obtain a theory of the rm, we must dene what integration is com-
pared to non-integration and explain, how the choice of ownership structure
a¤ects the model. As argued in the introduction, integration is assumed to
facilitate rent-seeking for the integrating party, but makes it harder for the
integrated one. To model this, we assume that there are two alienable (say,
physical) assets, a1 and a2, that can be used for rent-seeking purposes. For
instance, the party possessing a particular asset can threaten to withhold it
to the other party unless being substantially better o¤. In this context, we
introduce the functions I1 2 f0; 1g and I2 2 f0; 1g indicating whether party
1 (Ij = 1) or party 2 (Ij = 0) owns asset aj, j = 1; 2. Integration then
means that both assets are allocated to a single party, while non-integration
is achieved by giving each party exactly one of the assets. Let dij  0 de-
note the amount of rent-seeking undertaken via asset aj by party i.9 This
rent-seeking leads to costs K(dij), where K() is supposed to be strictly in-
creasing, strictly convex and satisfyingK(0) = 0,K 0(0) = 0 andK 0(dij) =1
7For the logit-form contest see, for example, Tullock (1980). For a formal proof that
part (iv) of Assumption 1 is fullled in both kinds of contest see Dixit (1987).
8See, e.g., Lazear & Rosen (1981).
9Note that party i can use the asset aj for rent-seeking purposes only if it owns the
asset.
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for dij !1.10
Further, suppose that there are two inalienable assets representing the
human capital that belongs to each party. As in the case of alienable assets,
a party may threaten to withhold its human capital so that human capital
may be used for rent-seeking purposes as well. The variable xi  0 represents
party is amount of rent-seeking undertaken via inalienable asset and C(xi)
the corresponding costs, withC() as an strictly increasing and strictly convex
function satisfying C(0) = 0, C 0(0) = 0, C 0(xi) = 1 for xi ! 1. We
assume that total rent-seeking by either party is simply the sum of rent-
seeking undertaken via alienable and inalienable assets. Together with the
convexity of the cost functions, this implies that the integrating party can
exert a certain amount of total rent-seeking at lower costs, making formally
the assumption discussed in the introduction.11 Assumption 2 summarizes
the foregoing arguments:
Assumption 2: (i) y1 = x1 +
P
j Ijd1j, (ii) y2 = x2 +
P
j(1  Ij)d2j, (iii)
C1 = C(x1) +
P
j IjK(d1j), (iv) C2 = C(x2) +
P
j(1  Ij)K(d2j).
The timing of the model is as follows: At stage 1, the parties decide how
to allocate the assets. As they are risk-neutral and unlimitedly liable, they
choose the ownership structure minimizing total rent-seeking costs, C1+C2.
At stage 2, they choose their rent-seeking activities. In this context, we as-
sume that neither the size of the rent nor the amount of rent seeking under-
taken (or, alternatively, the rent-seeking costs) are veriable to a third party
(e.g. a court). Consequently, the parties cannot write enforceable contracts
to address the rent-seeking problem and we solve for a Nash-equilibrium of
10The last two conditions ensure the existence of an interior solution in the static model.
11Note that the cost advantage could also be modeled by canceling the explicit distinc-
tion between alienable and inalienable assets and assuming that total rent-seeking costs
are given by Ci(yi; i), where i depends on how many alienable assets party i possesses.
In this way, however, the decision to integrate could be driven by assumptions on how i
a¤ects Ci. This dependence of ownership structures on assumptions about certain model
parameters is avoided under the current model specication.
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the contest in a typical Cournot fashion. Finally, at stage 3, nature chooses
a winner to the contest who is awarded the rent.
2.2 Solution to the model
We derive the solution for the case of non-integration and integration sep-
arately. Consider rst the non-integration case, where each party possesses
one alienable and one inalienable asset. Without loss of generality party 1 (2)
is assumed to possess asset a1 (a2). The two partiesmaximization problems
are then given by
max
x1;d11
p(x1 + d11; x2 + d22)R  C(x1) K(d11); (2)
max
x2;d22
(1  p(x1 + d11; x2 + d22))R  C(x2) K(d22) (3)
The rst-order conditions to the two maximization-problems are12
p1(x

1 + d

11; x

2 + d

22)R  C 0(x1) = 0 (4)
p1(x

1 + d

11; x

2 + d

22)R K 0(d11) = 0 (5)
 p2(x1 + d11; x2 + d22)R  C 0(x2) = 0 (6)
 p2(x1 + d11; x2 + d22)R K 0(d22) = 0 (7)
Suppose that x1 > x

2. From this condition, it follows that d

11 > d

22,
x1 + d

11 = y

1 > y

2 = x

2 + d

22 and p1(y

1; y

2) >  p2(y1; y2). Di¤erentiat-
ing the symmetry assumption on the contest-success function p, p (y1; y2) =
1   p (y2; y1), with respect to y1 yields p1 (y1; y2) =  p2 (y2; y1). Hence,
p1(y

1; y

2) >  p2(y1; y2) can be rewritten as p1(y1; y2) > p1(y2; y1). It is then
a very easy task to show that p1(y2; y

1)  p1(y1; y1) > p1(y1; y2), where the
rst inequality follows from p11  0 and the second from p12 > 0, for p > 0:5.
This contradicts the assumption p1(y1; y

2) > p1(y

2; y

1) and, hence, x

1 > x

2.
Similarly, one can show that x1 < x

2 is incompatible with conditions (4) to
12The second-order conditions are satised. Except for a specic example to be presented
in Appendix B, for which a further parameter restriction is needed, the same holds for all
maximization problems that follow.
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(7) so that the equilibrium is symmetric with x1 = x

2 =: x
N , d11 = d

22 =: d
N
and x1+d

11 = x

2+d

22 =: y
N . Using this symmetry, the rst-order conditions
simplify to
p1(y
N ; yN)R  C 0(xN) = 0 (8)
p1(y
N ; yN)R K 0(dN) = 0 (9)
Let us now turn to the case of integration. As both parties are symmetric,
it does not matter for our results, whether party 1 or party 2 is the integrating
party. Assume, therefore, that party 1 integrates and possesses both alienable
assets in addition to its inalienable one. Then, party 1 maximizes
p(x1 + d11 + d12; x2)R  C(x1) K(d11) K(d12) (10)
while party 2 maximizes
(1  p(x1 + d11 + d12; x2))R  C(x2) (11)
Denote by xI1, x
I
2, d
I
1 and d
I
2 the solution to these maximization problems.
This solution is given by the rst-order conditions
p1(x
I
1 + d
I
1 + d
I
2; x
I
2)R  C 0(xI1) = 0 (12)
p1(x
I
1 + d
I
1 + d
I
2; x
I
2)R K 0(dI1) = 0 (13)
p1(x
I
1 + d
I
1 + d
I
2; x
I
2)R K 0(dI2) = 0 (14)
 p2(xI1 + dI1 + dI2; xI2)R  C 0(xI2) = 0 (15)
First, note that integration does not eliminate rent seeking as assumed in
much of the informal literature on the theory of the rm. The integrated
party still tries to use its inalienable asset for rent-seeking purposes.13 Never-
theless, under quite general conditions integration alleviates the rent-seeking
problem, as the following proposition shows.
13The result that rent-seeking e¤orts are strictly positive follows directly from our as-
sumptions on the single cost functions. Note, however, that rent-seeking costs are also
strictly positive. This can be seen by inspection of the rst-order conditions. As p1; p2
and R are strictly positive, respectively, C 0 and K 0 must, at the optimum, be strictly
positive, too. The latter observation implies that rent-seeking costs are strictly positive in
equilibrium.
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Proposition 1 If  p11 and p22 are not too large, total rent-seeking costs
are strictly higher under non-integration than under integration. Then, the
parties always decide to integrate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 states that integration mitigates the rent-seeking problem
and is therefore preferred, if other instruments to address this problem are
not available. The main advantage of integration is that it makes the rent-
seeking contest uneven and, accordingly, less intense.14 As a consequence,
the integrating partys rent-seeking e¤orts are always lower than the cor-
responding e¤orts under non-integration. On the other hand, whether the
integrated partys rent-seeking e¤ort is also lower, is determined by a trade-
o¤ of two countervailing e¤ects. Next to the already mentioned "competition
e¤ect", there is a second e¤ect due to the diminishing marginal returns of
rent seeking. This second e¤ect follows from the result that the integrated
partys total rent seeking decreases, as it cannot use any alienable asset for
rent-seeking purposes. Since p22  0, this may make it more attractive for
this party to use the inalienable asset in the rent-seeking contest. Hence, even
if yI2 < y
N , it might be that xI2 > x
N . In this case, it would be impossible to
say whether integration or non-integration leads to higher total rent-seeking
costs, although integration is probably still optimal. To rank the ownership
structures unambiguously, we limit the positive e¤ect on xI2 by imposing the
restriction on p22. A similar restriction on p11 must be imposed, if party 2
is the integrating party. Note, however, that these restrictions are su¢ cient
conditions that are usually excessively strong. Further, we suppose for the re-
mainder of the paper that the restrictions do indeed hold so that integration
is always selected in the static model.
Before turning to the multi-period model, it is interesting to compare
integration as the so far proposed solution to the rent-seeking problem with
14Note that it has been shown before that more uneven contests may lead to lower rent
dissipation. See, for example, Baik (1994). However, this has always been done under
quite restrictive assumptions on the contest-success function p().
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another solution proposed in the economic literature, namely strategic dele-
gation. As shown by Wärneryd (2000), strategic delegation may mitigate the
rent-seeking problem, if delegates are limitedly liable. Under limited liability,
they are given weaker incentives as the original contestants would face and
so rent-seek less. In contrast to integration, however, strategic delegation is
vulnerable to secret renegotiation. In particular, given the delegation equi-
librium, the original contestant would have an incentive to pay the delegate
his expected payo¤ from taking part in the contest and secretly engage in
rent-seeking himself. This problem is avoided under integration, i.e. under
integration there is no scope for secret renegotiation. Therefore, integration
is a more robust commitment device than strategic delegation.
3 A multi-period model of rent-seeking be-
tween and within rms
3.1 Additional assumptions
In this section, we consider the innitely-repeated version of the stage game
from the previous section. Our aim is to analyze the properties of relational
contracts between the parties. To do so, some additional assumptions have
to be introduced.
First, we assume that either party can observe, whether or not the other
party has engaged in rent-seeking, i.e. party i can observe, whether yj = 0 or
yj > 0, i 6= j. This is a realistic assumption, as it is very di¢ cult to nd out
the exact amount of rent seeking of the other party, while it is quite likely
that one gets to know, whether the other party engaged in rent seeking at
all.
Hence, the parties could enter a relational agreement, under which each
promises not to engage in rent seeking.15 We assume that such a relational
15In principle, there are two kinds of relational contracts. In the rst, both parties
promise not to engage in rent seeking. In the second, only one party gives this promise,
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agreement is sustained by Grim-Trigger strategies. That is, each party starts
by cooperating (i.e. by choosing yi = 0) and continues cooperation unless
one party defects, in which case it refuses to cooperate forever after. Thus, if
the relational agreement is reneged on once, the parties switch to the stage-
game Nash-equilibrium derived in Section 2.16 In this context, we assume
that renegotiation of the ownership structure is possible and may occur at
zero cost.17 Therefore, after a breach of the relational contract, the parties
always choose to integrate in order to save on rent-seeking expenditures.
Each party is assumed to discount future utility with a common factor
 2 (0; 1). Alternatively,  may describe the probability that the parties
continue their relationship in the next period. Moreover, we assume that
while the other party chooses a strictly positive level of rent seeking. Our main focus is
on the former kind of contract. The latter is discussed in Section 4.2.
16These strategies are sometimes argued to be problematic, as they are not renegotiation-
proof. To see this, note that the game remaining after one party defects coincides with the
game as a whole. As a consequence, equilibria being available in the game as a whole should
also be available after the relational agreement was broken. Thus, the parties should be
able to renegotiate from punishment to a di¤erent equilibrium with higher payo¤s. This
problem, however, can be easily solved (see e.g. the textbook by Bolton & Dewatripont
(2005), p. 467): Instead of playing the stage-game Nash equilibrium in the punishment
phase, the parties could play jointly e¢ cient punishments, but change the division of the
surplus after a deviation. In particular, the division should be changed such that the
deviating party receives exactly the same payo¤ as in the Nash-equilibrium of the stage
game. Note that all results to be derived remain the same, if we assume the parties to
follow this second type of strategy.
Further, if exactly one party deviates from the agreement, one might also think that
the parties switch from the two-sided relational contract to a one-sided one, under which
the party, which reneged on the contract, chooses a strictly positive level of rent seeking.
The main results to be derived would also hold in this setting.
17The main result to be derived in this section is that non-integration may be benecial,
as it facilitates the sustainment of relational contracts. This result would even be enforced,
if the ownership structure could not be renegotiated easily. In this case, non-integration
had the additional e¤ect that it leads to a higher punishment in case the relational agree-
ment was broken. Then, the range of parameter values, for which a relational contract is
sustainable under non-integration would further increase.
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each party has equal bargaining power. This is in line with our consideration
of homogeneous parties.
3.2 Two-sided relational contracts
Under a two-sided relational contract, each party promises to choose yi = 0.
If a party deviates optimally from this promise, it realizes a gain in the
current period, as the benet of being more likely to win the rent outweighs
the additional rent-seeking costs. However, in future periods, it is worse o¤
since it is no longer trusted.
We start by analyzing the one-period gain, if deviating from the agree-
ment. The optimal deviation of party 1 depends on the chosen ownership
structure and maximizes the subsequent expression,
G = p(x1 +
X
j
Ijd1j; 0)R  C(x1) 
X
j
IjK(d1j) (16)
from which the following lemma can be derived:
Lemma 1 A partys one-period gain of deviating from the relational agree-
ment is higher the more assets the party possesses and increasing in the size
of the rent, R.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 is very intuitive. A party deviating from the relational agree-
ment chooses a strictly positive level of rent-seeking. The more assets the
party possesses the lower are the corresponding rent-seeking costs. Alterna-
tively, it can choose a higher level of rent seeking at the same costs. Hence,
the one-period gain of deviating from the relational agreement is clearly
higher. Further, a higher rent makes it more protable to deviate from the
agreement, as the reward for outperforming the other party is higher.
Let us now come to the costs of deviating from the relational agreement in
form of higher rent-seeking costs in future periods. If the relational contract
is reneged on, the parties choose integration and total per-period rent-seeking
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costs are given by CT := C(xI1) + C(x
I
2) +K(d
I
1) +K(d
I
2). As both parties
have equal bargaining power, their per-period expected utility after a devia-
tion from the relational agreement is given by 0:5(R CT ). If the relational
agreement is not reneged on, the respective expected utility is given by 0:5R.
Hence, the costs of deviating from the relational agreement are given by
0:5CT
1  . As well known from other models on relational contracting, these
costs are increasing in , as a higher  implies a less heavy discounting of
utility from future periods. Further, note that the costs do not depend on
the initial allocation of the assets, i.e. the allocation of assets at the time the
relational agreement was entered. Finally, we can relate CT and, accordingly,
the costs of deviating from the agreement to the size of the rent, R. In this
context, it can be shown that CT usually increases in R. More concretely,
after an increase in R, the integrating party always increases its rent-seeking
e¤orts, which, correspondingly, leads to higher costs. Whether the integrated
party rent-seeks more, depends on two countervailing e¤ects. First, there is a
direct positive e¤ect on rent seeking due to the higher rent. Second, there is
an indirect e¤ect, too, as the higher e¤orts of the integrating party discour-
age the integrated one and make it less attractive for the latter to engage in
rent seeking. The direct e¤ect is dominant and, hence, an increase in the rent
certainly leads to higher costs of deviating from the relational agreement, if
the cross derivatives p12 and p21 are not too large. Note, however, that, simi-
lar to the argumentation in connection with Proposition 1, this is a su¢ cient
condition, which is oftentimes too strong. The next lemma summarizes these
results.
Lemma 2 The costs of deviating from the relational agreement are inde-
pendent of the number of assets each party possesses. Further, if the cross
derivatives p12 and p21 are not too large, the costs are increasing in the size
of the rent, R.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Comparing gains and costs of deviating from the relational contract, it
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is straightforward to derive the next proposition, which contains the main
result of the paper.
Proposition 2 Denote by N and I the minimal discount factor under non-
integration and integration, respectively, for which a two-sided relational con-
tract is feasible. Then, I > N . Hence, if  2 [N ; I), only non-integration
makes two-sided relational contracts sustainable and is therefore preferred.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that a two-sided relational contract, under
which both parties do not engage in rent seeking, is more di¢ cult to sustain
under integration than under non-integration. This represents an important
downside to integration, which was not simply assumed, but derived endoge-
nously. The reason is that the integrating party can choose a certain level of
rent seeking at lower costs and, hence, is more tempted to deviate from the
relational contract than any party under non-integration. This nding seems
to map practice very well. To give an example, take a look at the Japanese
automobile industry, which is famous for its comprehensive reliance on rela-
tional contracts. The industry has attracted many researchers and detailed
descriptions of its functioning have been given.18 To connect these descrip-
tions with our model, consider the following statements by Holmström &
Roberts (1998, p. 81, 82):
"The key to making [the Japanese] system work is obviously the long-
term repeated nature of the interaction. Although supply contracts are nom-
inally year-by-year, the shared understanding is that the chosen supplier will
have the business until the model is redesigned, which lasts typically four
or ve years. Moreover, the expectation is that rms will continue to do
business together indenitely.[...] The familiar logic of repeated games, that
future rewards and punishments motivate current behavior, supports the on-
going dealings. An attempted hold-up would presumably bring severe future
18See, for instance, Asanuma (1989, 1992), Taylor & Wiggins (1997) or Holmström &
Roberts (1998).
16
penalties.[...] Perhaps the major problem in the system may be that the au-
tomakers are inherently too powerful and thus face too great a temptation
to misbehave opportunistically." (emphasis added)
The nal statement can be understood as an informal description of our
main result that a party, which possesses many assets and, hence, is relatively
powerful may be tempted to renege on the relational contract. To sustain
relational contracts in spite of the potential dominance of the automakers,
our model would propose to make the situation more even. Note that this
is exactly the case in the Japanese automobile industry. First, automakers
oftentimes purchase their intermediate products from independent suppli-
ers, i.e. suppliers owning their production facilities themselves, which means
that they choose non-integration as the primary ownership structure. Sec-
ond, suppliers are organized in a supplier association, which aims at further
counterbalancing the initial power asymmetry.
As mentioned in the introduction, a main nding of the empirical litera-
ture on the theory of the rm is that integration is more likely to be chosen
for higher values of the rent, R. To relate the model to this nding, recall
that integration is optimal in the absence of relational contracts, but non-
integration is (maybe uniquely) optimal, if two-sided relational contracts are
feasible. Thus, the model predictions are in line with the empirical facts, if
the sustainability of two-sided relational contracts decreases in the size of the
rent. In the (relatively) general model that we have presented, however, this
cannot be shown. All we can say is that an increase in R (usually) has two
countervailing e¤ects on the sustainability of relational contracts, as both,
the one-period gain and the future costs of deviating from the relational
agreement get higher. It is, however, easy to nd examples for which the
rst e¤ect is always dominant. Assume, for instance, that party i is awarded
the rent, if yi + "i > yj + "j,19 where "i is an error term being independently
and uniformly distributed on the interval [ a; a], with a > 0. Further, let
C(xi) =
c
2
x2i and K(dij) =
c
2
d2ij. Then, the rst e¤ect is always dominant and
19This decision "rule" is an example of a probit-form contest.
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the relational agreement becomes less stable, as the rent increases20, which
ts very well to the empirical facts.
4 Discussion
4.1 Di¤erent contest-success functions
Up to this point, we have assumed that p is everywhere di¤erentiable. This
is e.g. usually the case, if a probit-form contest is considered. In some
applications, however, the contest-success function is supposed to have the
following logit-form:
p(y1; y2) =
(
f1(y1)
f1(y1)+f2(y2)
, if f1(y1) + f2(y2) > 0
0:5, otherwise
(17)
The functions f1() and f2() are increasing, concave and non-negative. If
then f1(0) = f2(0) = 0, p is discontinuous and non-di¤erentiable at y1 =
y2 = 0 implying that p(; 0) = 1, for  > 0 and  ! 0. In this case, the
optimal deviation from a two-sided relational contract is to marginally raise
total rent-seeking activities and capture the rent with probability one. Then,
the one-period gain from deviating is independent of the ownership structure
and given by R so that the results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 no longer
hold.
Nevertheless, even with a contest-success function of the form (17), there
are possible and convincing modications of the model, which extinct the
problems due to a discontinuity of p so that all derived results continue to
hold. First, one could simply assume that f1(0); f2(0) > 0, which is, as an
ad-hoc assumption, not more restrictive than f1(0) = f2(0) = 0. Second,
one could assume f1(0) = f2(0) = 0 and modify the assumption that party
i can observe, whether or not yj > 0. Instead, one could assume that it
can observe, whether or not yj > y^, with y^ > 0. That is, it can observe,
20Appendix B presents the example in a more detailed way and contains a formal proof
of this statement.
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whether party j engages moderately or heavily in rent-seeking, while we still
do not need the rather unrealistic assumption that the exact level of yj is
observable. If, then, y^ is not too large, we obtain the same results as in the
model presented so far.
4.2 One-sided relational contracts
As mentioned in Section 3, a two-sided contract may not be the only form
of relational agreement. The parties may also enter a one-sided relational
contract, under which one party promises not to engage in rent seeking, but
the other is allowed to do so. Under such a contract, the latter party (say
party i) chooses its best response to yj = 0. Hence, the only party that might
be interested in deviating from the agreement, is the party promising not to
rent-seek.
There are di¤erent e¤ects on the sustainability and protability of one-
sided relational contracts. A complete formal treatment of these e¤ects is
beyond the scope of this paper. What we will do, however, is to provide an
informal treatment, which is helpful in developing a deeper understanding
of this kind of contract. Let us begin with the sustainability that is again
determined by comparison of gains and costs of deviating from the relational
agreement. Note rst that the costs of deviating from the agreement still do
not depend on the chosen ownership structure, as costless renegotiation of
the ownership structure is assumed. The corresponding gain, on the other
hand, is a¤ected by the ownership structure through two channels. First, we
have the same e¤ect as in the previous section, namely that possessing more
assets makes it less costly to choose a certain level of rent seeking so that
the gain of deviating from the relational agreement increases. Second, we
have an additional e¤ect, as the opponent party engages in rent seeking and
chooses its best-response to yj = 0. This e¤ect depends on the ownership
structure as follows: Suppose that the party promising not to engage in rent
seeking transfers an asset to the other party. Then, the latter party increases
its rent-seeking activities, as rent seeking becomes less costly for it. This
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decreases both, the former partys winning-probability in case of honoring
and not honoring the relational contract and, thus, a¤ects the gain of deviat-
ing from the agreement through the cross derivative pij. It may or may not
enforce the rst e¤ect. Hence, in order to give general predictions about how
the sustainability of one-sided relational contracts depends on the ownership
structure, we have to impose further restrictions on pij. If this derivative is
not too large, the rst e¤ect always dominates. Then, withdrawing an asset
from the party promising not to engage in rent seeking makes the contract
more easily sustainable. This implies that a one-sided relational contract is
most easily sustainable under integration, if the integrated party promises not
to engage in rent seeking. Furthermore, such a contract is more easily sus-
tainable than a two-sided relational contract since the latter type of contract
is most easily sustainable under non-integration. Hence, there are parameter
constellations, for which one-sided relational contracts are sustainable, but
two-sided contracts are not.
Concerning the protability of one-sided relational contracts, it does not
su¢ ce to consider their sustainability. As one party engages in rent seeking,
it must also be captured that the cost this rent seeking entails may di¤er
between the single ownership structures. Unfortunately, there are two coun-
tervailing e¤ects, both of which may be dominant21. First, the partys rent
seeking increases, if it has access to more assets. On the other hand, pos-
sessing more assets makes rent seeking less costly so that the costs, entailed
by rent-seeking, decrease. As either e¤ect may be dominant, one cannot
rank the ownership structures unambiguously. Nevertheless, one can show
that one-sided relational contracts improve the situation compared to the
setting in Section 2, where no relational agreements are feasible at all. This
is intuitive. As one party does not engage in rent seeking, competition is ex-
tremely weak. Therefore, the other party chooses lower rent-seeking e¤orts
(as compared to the setting in Section 2), too. Combined with the result
21Using the specic example already considered in Section 3.2, this is shown in Appendix
B.
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that one-sided contracts may be the only form of relational agreement to be
sustained, this points to the potential importance of this kind of contract.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a formal rent-seeking theory of the rm. The main idea
is that a transfer of an asset from one party to another makes rent seeking
less costly for the new and more costly for the initial owner. Under this
assumption, it can be shown that integration is optimal in the absence of
relational contracts, for, in this case, integration makes the contest less even
and, hence, less intense. Two-sided relational contracts, however, may only
be sustainable under non-integration, in which case this ownership structure
is optimal.
Several extensions of the model could be addressed. First, one could
consider a setting with n>2 parties. In such a situation, similar results as
in the two-party setting should be derived. If no relational contracts are
feasible, all assets should be transferred to one party to make the contest
uneven. Otherwise, it might be better to allocate the assets to more than
one party.
Second, we could assume that the parties are heterogeneous in the sense
that they have di¤erent haggling abilities. Here, in a situation without re-
lational contracts, all assets should be allocated to the most able party in
order to make the contest least intense. Di¤erent from our results, however,
integration by the less able party may be the only ownership structure under
which two-sided relational contracts are feasible. This ownership structure
may make rent seeking equally costly for both parties (the more able party
may have a cost advantage due to its ability, the other party due to posses-
sion of more assets) and so may limit the one-period gain of deviating from
the relational contract of both parties.
Third, one could model relational contracts using a nite-horizon ap-
proach with parties of di¤erent types; honest parties, who always stick to
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their promises and dishonest ones, who stick to their promises only if this
pays o¤ for them.22 Such an approach may be benecial, as it can explain
changes in ownership structures over time. If a type of a party is revealed
in the course of the game, it may be optimal to switch to another ownership
structure. The current modeling approach cannot explain such changes, as,
on the equilibrium path, the chosen ownership structure is always the same.
Appendix A (Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and Lemmas 1, 2) :
Proof of Proposition 1:
We prove Proposition 1 by demonstrating that xI1; x
I
2 < x
N and dI1; d
I
2 <
dN . Consider rst the condition xI1 < x
N . This condition is equivalent to
p1(x
I
1+d
I
1+d
I
2; x
I
2) < p1(y
N ; yN). Dene yI1 := x
I
1+d
I
1+d
I
2 and y
I
2 := x
I
2. We
introduce a case distinction. In the rst case, yI1  yN . Suppose, then, that
xI1  xN . As shown before, this implies p1(xI1 + dI1 + dI2; xI2)  p1(yN ; yN),
from which it follows that dI1  dN . This last condition together with dI2 > 0
contradicts the initial assumption yI1  yN . Hence, with yI1  yN , it must be
that xI1 < x
N .
In the second case, let yI1 > y
N . Further, assume yI2 < y
N . Then,
p
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

> 0:5. Moreover, the condition p1
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

< p1(y
N ; yN) can be
rewritten as p1
 
yN + a; yN   b < p1(yN ; yN), with a; b > 0. As p11  0 and
p12 > 0 for p > 0:5, it follows that p1
 
yN + a; yN   b  p1  yN ; yN   b <
p1(y
N ; yN) and hence, xI1 < x
N , hold, if yI2 < y
N .
It remains to show that yI1 > y
N and yI2  yN cannot simultaneously hold.
yI2  yN implies that  p2
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

>  p2(yN ; yN), p2(yN ; yN) > p2
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

.
If yI1 > y
N and yI2  yN , the last condition can be rewritten as p2(yN ; yN) >
p2
 
yN + c; yN + d

, with c > 0 and d  0. If c > d, p > 0:5. Then,
p2
 
yN + c; yN + d
  p2  yN + c; yN > p2  yN ; yN since p22  0 and p21 >
0, for p > 0:5, which contradicts our initial assumption. Further, c  d would
require yI1  yI2. As K 0(0) = 0, this would imply  p2
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

> p1
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

,
or, using the symmetry of p, p1
 
yI2 ; y
I
1

> p1
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

. Note, however, that
p1
 
yI1 ; y
I
2
  p1  yI2 ; yI2  p1  yI2 ; yI1, where the rst inequality follows from
22See for such a nite-horizon approach e.g. Hart & Holmström (1987) or Gürtler (2006).
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p11  0 and the second from p12 > 0 for p > 0:5. This is a contradiction. It
follows that yI1 > y
I
2, which su¢ ces to show that x
I
1 < x
N . Analogously, one
can show that dI1; d
I
2 < d
N .
Finally, we have to show that xI2 < x
N , which is equivalent to p2
 
yI1 ; y
I
2

<
 p2(yN ; yN) , p1
 
yI2 ; y
I
1

< p1(y
N ; yN). The proof is by contradiction. We
suppose that xI2  xN , which is equivalent to p1
 
yI2 ; y
I
1
  p1(yN ; yN). Re-
call that yI1 > y
I
2. Then, as shown before, it must be that y
I
2 < y
N (as
yI1 > y
N and yI2  yN cannot simultaneously hold). Let us rewrite the condi-
tion p1
 
yI2 ; y
I
1
  p1(yN ; yN) as p1  yN + e; yN + f  p1(yN ; yN), with e < 0,
f ? 0 and e < f . Note that p1
 
yN + e; yN + f

< p1
 
yN + e; yN + e

.
Moreover, p1
 
yN + e; yN + e
  p1  yN ; yN + e < p1  yN ; yN. The term
p1
 
yN + e; yN + e
 p1  yN ; yN + e can be rewritten as y
N+eZ
yN
p11
 
t; yN + e

dt =
 
yNZ
yN+e
p11
 
t; yN + e

dt. Hence, if p11 becomes very small, p1
 
yN + e; yN + e
 
p1
 
yN ; yN + e

becomes small, too, so that p1
 
yN + e; yN + e
  p1  yN ; yN.
It then follows that p1
 
yN + e; yN + f

< p1
 
yN ; yN

, which contradicts the
assumption xI2  xN . Hence, it must be that xI2 < xN .
The proof in the case party 2 is the integrating party is totally analogous.
The only di¤erence is that p22 (instead of  p11) must be small enough. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:
To prove the rst part of the lemma consider two situations: In the rst,
party 1 possesses only its inalienable asset. In the second, it additionally
possesses the rst alienable asset. Suppose that, in the rst situation, party
1 chooses a certain level of rent-seeking, say y^, and su¤ers rent-seeking costs
C^. Then, in the second situation, it can choose the level y^+, with  > 0 and
! 0 at the same cost C^, as K 0(0) = 0. However, as p1 > 0, it is better o¤
compared to the rst situation. With a similar argumentation, one can show
that a party possessing both alienable assets (in addition to its inalienable
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one) is better o¤ than a party possessing only one alienable asset.
The second part is easily proved as well. Suppose that, initially, the
rent is given by R1. Denote party 1s optimal deviation in this case by ~y.
The gain from this deviation is given by pR1   ~C, where p denotes the
di¤erence in winning-probabilities and ~C the cost from choosing ~y. Now let
the rent increase from R1 to R2 > R1. If the party still chose ~y, the gain from
deviation would change to pR2   ~C > pR1   ~C. If it decides to choose
y 6= ~y, this must make the party (weakly) better o¤. Hence, the gain from
deviating must increase in R. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The rst part of Lemma 2 is obvious and therefore omitted. Concerning
the second part of the lemma, recall that the costs of deviating from the
relational agreement are given by 0:5CT
1  . Hence, these costs are certainly
increasing in the size of the rent, if each of the outlays, xI1, x
I
2, d
I
1 and d
I
2, is
increasing in R. We prove this for the special case, where C() = K(). The
proof for the case C() 6= K() is analogous, but extremely messy. Suppose
that party 1 is the integrating party. Then, we have, with C() = K(),
xI1 = d
I
1 = d
I
2 =: x^ and the rst-order conditions simplify to
p1(3x^; x
I
2)R  C 0(x^) = 0
 p2(3x^; xI2)R  C 0(xI2) = 0
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to R yields the following two conditions:
p1(3x^; x
I
2) +R

3p11(3x^; x
I
2)
@x^
@R
+ p12(3x^; x
I
2)
@xI2
@R

  C 00(x^) @x^
@R
= 0
 p2(3x^; xI2) R

3p21(3x^; x
I
2)
@x^
@R
+ p22(3x^; x
I
2)
@xI2
@R

  C 00(xI2)
@xI2
@R
= 0
Transforming these equations yields
@x^
@R
=
Rp12(3x^; x
I
2)
@xI2
@R
+ p1(3x^; x
I
2)
 3Rp11(3x^; xI2) + C 00(x^)
@xI2
@R
=
 3Rp21(3x^; xI2) @x^@R   p2(3x^; xI2)
Rp22(3x^; xI2) + C
00(xI2)
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Note that both denominators are strictly positive. Further, note that p12(3x^; xI2) >
0 and p21(3x^; xI2) > 0, as p > 0:5. From the above condition, we see that
@x^
@R
 0 can only hold if @xI2
@R
< 0. However, from the second condition, we
see that @x
I
2
@R
< 0 can only hold, if @x^
@R
> 0. Hence, it must be that @x^
@R
> 0.
Then, if p21 is not too large,
@xI2
@R
> 0, too, so that CT is strictly increasing
in R. The case, where party 2 is the integrating party is totally analogous.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The minimal discount factors are given by the following two conditions:
GN =
0:5NCT
1  N
GI =
0:5ICT
1  I
Here, GN denotes the one-period gain from optimally deviating from the
relational agreement under non-integration and GI the respective gain of the
integrating party under integration. From Lemma 1, we know that GI > GN .
It directly follows that I > N . Q.E.D.
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Appendix B (Specic example):
In this appendix, we consider a specic example. In this example, we rst
show that two-sided relational contracts become less easily sustainable, as the
rent increases. Second, we show that either of the e¤ects on the protability
of one-sided relational contracts may be dominant.
Suppose that party i is awarded the rent, if yi + "i > yj + "j, where
"i is uniformly distributed on the interval [ a; a], with a > 0. Further,
let C(xi) = c2x
2
i and K(dij) =
c
2
d2ij. Party 1s winning-probability is given
by Probfy1 + "1 > y2 + "2g =: H (y1   y2), where H() is the distribution
function of the composed random variable "2 "1 and h() the corresponding
density function. As e.g. shown by Kräkel (2000), H() and h() are given
by23
H (y1   y2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0, if y1   y2 <  2a
y1 y2
2a
+ (y1 y2)
2
8a2
+ 0:5, if   2a  y1   y2  0
y1 y2
2a
  (y1 y2)2
8a2
+ 0:5, if 0 < y1   y2  2a
1, if y1   y2 > 2a
h(y1   y2) =
8>><>>:
1
2a
+ y1 y2
4a2
, if   2a  y1   y2  0
1
2a
  y1 y2
4a2
, if 0  y1   y2  2a
0, otherwise
Consider the static scenario and assume that party 2 was integrated by party
1. Then, it is easy to show that the partiesrent-seeking e¤orts xI1, x
I
2, d
I
1
and dI2 are all the same and given by the following rst-order condition:
24
(
1
2a
  2x
I
1
4a2
)R  cxI1 = 0, xI1 =
aR
2a2c+R
Total rent-seeking costs in the static scenario then equal CT = 2ca
2R2
(2a2c+R)2
.
23Note that H() is not di¤erentiable at  2a, 0 and 2a. However, this is unproblematic,
as, in contrast to the contest-success functions from Section 4.1, H() is continuous.
24We considered the interval [0; 2a], when deriving the rst-order conditions. Note that
this was correct, as 2xc1 =
2aR
2a2c+R does indeed lie in [0; 2a]. Further, the second-order
condition for party 1 is always fullled. For party 2, we need as a further restriction
R < 4ca2 to guarantee the fulllment of the second-order condition.
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Let us now turn to the dynamic scenario. To begin, we consider the case
of two-sided relational contracts and assume that the parties choose non-
integration (This assumption facilitates the analysis, but does not a¤ect the
results). The best deviation from a two-sided relational contract for party
1 is its best response to y2 = 0. This best response is again symmetric and
given by the same condition as the rent-seeking e¤orts in the static scenario
under integration, namely xd1 = d
d
1 =
aR
2a2c+R
. We are now able to calculate
the one-period gain from deviating, which equals
GN = R
 
2xd1
2a
 
 
2xd1
2
8a2
+ 0:5  0:5
!
  ca
2R2
(2a2c+R)2
= R

2R (2a2c+R)
2(2a2c+R)2
  R
2
2(2a2c+R)2

  2ca
2R2
2(2a2c+R)2
=
2ca2R2 +R3
2(2a2c+R)2
This gain must be compared to the costs of deviation, which are given by
0:5
1  CT =
2ca2R2
2(2a2c+R)2 (1  )
Hence, party 1 will renege on the contract, if and only if
2ca2R2 +R3
2(2a2c+R)2
>
2ca2R2
2(2a2c+R)2 (1  ) , R > 2ca
22   1
1  
It can directly be seen that the reneging temptation increases and a two-sided
relational contract becomes less easily sustainable, if R gets higher.
Let us now briey consider one-sided relational contracts. Suppose that
party 1 is the party that is allowed to engage in rent seeking. This partys
rent-seeking activities are again given by the best response to y2 = 0. In
analogy to the analysis of two-sided contracts, it can be shown that the
solution is symmetric and given by x^ = 2aR
4a2c+kR
, where k is either 1, 2 or
3 depending on whether party 1 possesses no, one or two alienable assets.
Total rent-seeking costs are then given by C^T = 0:5kc (x^)
2 = 2kca
2R2
(4a2c+kR)2
.
As k increases from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3, these costs may either increase or
27
decrease. Hence, each of the e¤ects on the protability of one-sided relational
contracts may be dominant.
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